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NOTES
Arbitration of Disputes Over New Labor
Contract Terms
INTRODUCTION
Voluntary arbitration in labor relations has been effectively employed
in ninety to ninety-five per cent of all collective bargaining agreements as
a final step in grievance procedure. However, it has rarely been used in
determining new contract terms.' Reaching agreement on the terms for
new or reopened contracts remains a major unsolved problem in labor re-
lations. Because this latter area is at the heart of most strike activity,2
negotiation of a new contract without outside assistance is generally
thought to be the best way of arriving at an agreement. However,
voluntary arbitration may offer a solution when direct negotiation fails
and mediation and conciliation prove ineffective, or when a strike is immi-
nent or in progress.
Voluntary arbitration is a private procedure that can assure the
parties of peaceful settlement of disputed contract terms. The initial
agreement to arbitrate stands as an example of responsible bargain-
ing. It is not imposed on the parties, but is a private procedure that can be
shaped to meet their particular needs while serving public interest
both in preserving industrial peace and preserving a free voluntary sys-
tem of bargaining. It must not, however, be considered a panacea; it is
only a method to be used as a last resort. It should not be employed as
an alternative to free collective bargaining, but should be regarded as an
adjunct to that process.
Labor and management must find an alternative to the wasteful,
economy-crippling strikes and lockouts that emanate from failure to
agree on contract terms, or else, as the imposition of compulsory arbitra-
tion in the 1963 railroad dispute indicates, the government will. That
legislation was the first of its kind in peacetime, and, though limited to
.specific issues, may represent a major failure in the free collective bar-
gaining system Furthermore, it indicates a trend toward more govern-
ment intervention with its attendant ills, some of which are eventual
1. See Basic Patterns in Labor Arbitration Agreements, 34 Lab. Arb. 931, 937 (1961); 2
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATION AND CONTRACTS, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS
§ 5:71; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTIcS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL No. 1381, ANALYSIS
OF WORK STOPPAGES 1962, 6 (1963).
2. Bergan, The Role of Law in Labor Relations, 13 LAB. LJ. 892, 894 (1962).
3. Pub. L No. 88, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 28, 1963).
4. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1963, p. 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1963, p. 9, col. 6.
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government determination of wages and other terms of employment, as
well as prices.
If, on the other hand, voluntary arbitration is to be accepted as a
better solution, the traditional arguments against its use must be over-
come. The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that much of the
criticism of voluntary arbitration is unwarranted, for the parties may so
frame their submission agreement and so constitute their arbitration
panel that an award reflecting adequate standards can be forthcoming
on a wide scope of subjects. This note will also discuss the enforceability
of awards in this "interest"5 or "quasi-legislative"' type of arbitration.
PERSPECTIVE ON THE WORK STOPPAGE PROBLEM
The number of work stoppages, the number of workers involved,
and the number of man-days lost are all significant indicators of the
extent of industrial disputes which cannot be resolved through peaceful
collective bargaining. Though there has been a large fluctuation both
in the number of man-days idle and the number of workers involved,
this fluctuation is considerably reduced when "major work stoppages"
- strikes involving over 10,000 workers - are separated from the
totals.
During the 13-year period from 1947 to 1959, 268 of the more than
53,000 recorded work stoppages involved 10,000 or more workers.
These major strikes accounted for 247 million man-days of idleness, or
slightly more than half (53.5 per cent) of the total direct strike-related
idleness registered over this period. The number of workers involved,
including duplication (i.e., workers involved in more than one stoppage
in any one year or over the 13-year period), amounted to 11,700,000,
or two out of every five involved in all work stoppages. In 1959, the
year of the 116-day steel strike, major strikes accounted for 73.7 per cent
of the total man-days idle. In the three following years, however, major
strikes accounted for only 31.2 per cent of total man-days idle.7
Beginning in mid-1960, the Bureau of Labor Statistics classified
strikes according to the status of union-management agreements at the
start of the stoppage. The figures for 1961 and 1962 are extremely
interesting. They show that disputes arising out of the renegotiation
of agreement terms, either at the expiration of the agreement or through
the exercise of reopening privileges, account for about four-fifths of the
5. See note 16 infra and accompanying text.
6. Ibid.
7. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL No. 1339, ANALYSIS OF
WORK STOPPAGES 1961, 8 (1962); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR,
BULL. No. 1381, ANALYSIS OF WORK STOPPAGES, 1962, 8 (1963).
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total idleness due to strikes. However, disputes where the parties had no
previous dealings, while accounting for 15 per cent of the total stoppages
in those years, accounted for only an additional 6 per cent of the total
idleness.'
How are these figures relevant to the present study? First, they
indicate that voluntary arbitration may be useful in the three situations
contributing to over four-fifths of the total idleness due to strikes;
namely, negotiation of a first agreement between the parties, creation
of a new agreement where the previous one has terminated, or renego-
tiation under a reopening clause. Second, the figures indicate that
itmajor strikes" contribute to a large portion of the total idleness, but
that this trend has been reduced in recent years. That -eduction may
be due in part to the adaptiveness of arbitration to labor problems apart
from bargaining agreements.
The National Joint Board for the Settlement of Disputes in the
Construction Industry, the 1958 Miami Agreement of the AFL-CIO
unions dealing with jurisdictional disputes, and the Missile Sites Com-
mission' are examples of the useful function to which arbitration has
been adapted to prevent major stoppages.'" It is worthy of mention
that noted arbitrators are also participating in a significant trend in
major industries to engage in what Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz
has characterized as "creative bargaining."" This is a system calling
for the parties to study jointly, during the period a contract is in effect,
the major problems which cannot be thoughtfully dealt with in those
hectic bargaining days just before the expiration of a contract. An ex-
ample of these forward looking programs that should help to decrease
the percentage of total idleness contributed by work stoppages from their
industry, is the Joint Human Relations Research Committee now operating
in the steel industry. Joint studies are also being carried out in the auto-
mobile, electrical, rubber, longshore, and other major industries. Many
of these programs employ neutral parties as advisors, consultants, or fact-
finders. This enhances the opportunity for protection of public interest
which, after all, is best protected by having differences settled without
work interruption. Finally, these programs often provide some means
of arriving at an agreement through either a more orderly presentation
by the parties of their positions, or in some cases, by ultimate reliance
on voluntary arbitration.
8. Ibid.
9. ExEc. ORDER No. 10946, 26 Fed. Reg. 4629 (1961).
10. Address by Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, Frank W. McCulloch,
Labor Arbitration Institute, Boston University School of Law, April 25, 1964.
11. Address to the National Academy of Arbitrators, Feb. 10, 1963, in 109 CoNG. REC. 2288
(daily ed. Feb. 18, 1963).
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BACKGROUND: DEFINITIONS AND DEVELOPMENT OF ARBITRATION
Defining and Distinguishing Terms
The distinction between collective bargaining, mediation, fact-finding,
and arbitration is best understood if each is considered as a stage in the
negotiating relationship between labor and management. 2 Collective
bargaining is the first stage and arbitration the last.
Mediation is the method of bringing the parties together thereby help-
ing them to reach a solution by theriselves. The mediator does not deter-
mine the solution; rather, he acts as i catalytic agent, bringing the parties
together and offering suggestions and advice. Conciliation has come
to mean the same thing as mediation, though formerly it involved a
more active attempt by the third party to help the parties to the nego-
tiations agree.' 3
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, established by
section 202 of the Labor Management Relations Act, is an independent
agency whose services have proved helpful in avoiding strikes or lockouts.
In fiscal 1962, the Mediation Service participated in 2,313 instances of
contract negotiations, or 7 per cent of all contracts negotiated. In a total
of 5,339 joint-meeting cases it aided in fiscal 1962, settlement was
achieved without strike or lockout. 4 The National Mediation Board,
created under the Railway Labor Act, performs a similar function in the
rail and airline industries. At the present time, forty-three states and the
District of Columbia also have some kind of mediation service. 5
At the fact-finding stage of negotiations, a designated board is given
the opportunity to investigate the matter; the findings are then reported
with or without recommendations. This statutory method usually has the
added prohibition of restraining the parties from resorting to strikes and
lockouts until the report is made. However, the disputants need not
accept the findings of the investigators, and once the report is made these
economic weapons may once again be employed. Thus, neither media-
tion nor fact-finding can assure industrial peace because the parties still
control settlement.
Arbitration is the method by which a dispute is settled according
to the binding decision of a neutral third party. The person or panel
acting as arbitrator is either chosen by the parties or appointed by
statute. However, if arbitration is imposed upon the parties by the
government, it is compulsory. Arbitration may be further divided into
12. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 3 (2d ed. 1960).
13. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, GROWTH OF LABOR LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 229-30
(1962); Note, The Peaceful Settlement Of Disputes Over Contract Terms, 58 Nw. U.L REV.
556 (1963).
14. 15 FED MED. AND CONCILIATION SERVICE ANN. REP. 2 (1963).
15. Note, The Legal Framework of Public Intervention In Industrial Disputes, 35 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 654, 674 (1960).
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two categories: (1) grievance arbitration, also called "rights" or "quasi-
judicial" arbitration, since the dispute is over rights created by contract
and the duty of the arbitrator is to interpret the contract; and (2)
contract, or "interest" or "quasi-legislative" arbitration, in which the
arbitrator's function is not to merely interpret the terms of an existing
agreement, but to establish future conditions. The issues involved in
the latter classification are usually more important to the parties than
those involved under "rights" arbitration. 6 Voluntary arbitration is
considered an adjunct of collective bargaining, but it is poles apart from
compulsory arbitration since in the latter method the parties have no
choice in either the procedure or the choice of arbitrators, unless the
statute so provides.
History and Development of Arbitration
The growth of private arbitration of labor disputes has been one of
the most significant factors in the development of industrial peace in
this country. Any attempt to trace its beginnings takes one back prior
to the establishment of a legal order in society.' 7 But,
at times it [arbitration] seems almost to disappear by reason of having
been superseded by a system of law that involves the compulsory sub-
mission of disputes to authority, rather than the voluntary selection of
and submission to an arbitrator.'8
It has been said that arbitration was first used by the ancient Egyp-
tians. Likewise, it was often resorted to in the classical age of the Greek
city-state, both to resolve congestion in the courts and to settle territorial
disputes. The system as it is applied to disputes in this country, however,
is a recent development.
Labor arbitration developed in the United States along with the
industrial revolution. Obviously, the concept of "rights" arbitration
which has become a normal part of labor relations today, could not have
become so until the collective bargaining contract also became a normal
part of the industrial scene. Thus, rights arbitration grew up with the
labor movement. It has further grown as an aid to the principle of
free collective bargaining. The strongest impetus to the use of arbitration
in this country was supplied by the creation of the National War Labor
Board which arose as a result of the need to maintain production for the
World War II effort. The economic weapons of strike and lockout gave
16. EuKouri & LKouRi, op. cit. supra note 12, at 30-31; Boston Printing Pressmen's
Union v. Potter Press, 141 F. Supp. 533 (D. Mass. 1956), aff'd, 241 E2d 787 (1st Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 817 (1957); CCH LAB. L. REP., UNION CONTRACTS ARBI-
TRATION 5 57002 (1961).
17. See Wolaver, The Historical Background of Comnercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV.
132 (1934).
18. UPnEGRAFF & McCoy, ARBITRATION OF LABOR DIsPuTEs 4 (2d ed. 1961).
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way to the "no-strike, no-lockout" pledge and to arbitration of labor
management disputes. 9 That policy of exchanging industrial peace over
agreement interpretation for the no-strike and no-lockout pledges has
carried over so that nearly all collective bargaining agreements today
have provisions for the arbitration of grievances.2" Arbitration of new
contract terms, on the other hand, has not met with the great favor that
has been accorded to "rights" arbitration.
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
Any argument in favor of increased use of voluntary arbitration in
contract dispute settlement must also necessarily discuss compulsory
arbitration. It has been suggested that this is an unwise approach, i.e.,
that the assumed threat of compulsory arbitration is not a sound argu-
ment for voluntary arbitration and that each dispute should be considered
on its own merits.2 ' The "which would you rather have" approach seems
to have validity in view of Congress' imposition of compulsory arbitration
on the parties in the 1963 railroad dispute.22 When efforts to get the
parties to agree to a voluntary arbitration procedure failed, this unprece-
dented action in the form of the first federal compulsory arbitration stat-
ute in peacetime was taken in order to insure that a strike would not take
place; or, at least not until the enforcement procedure in the award ended
or until issues not handled by the arbitration board were negotiated. The
neutral members of that statutorily created arbitration board left no doubt
of their preference for voluntary arbitration over compulsory arbitration.
They stated:
We wish at the very outset to record our regret that in this case the
leaders of the railroad industry and the railroad operating unions were
unable to agree upon some method of resolving their differences which
would avoid the need for Congressional intervention. The great virtue
of arbitration as it has developed in this country's labor relations has been
the fact that it was a voluntary procedure, created and shaped by the dis-
puting companies and unions themselves and thus responsive to their
peculiar problems, values, and needs. It is unfortunate that the parties
in this case, though finally agreeing in principle to arbitration, failed to
agree upon the terms and procedures of an arbitration agreement and
thereby abandoned to Congress an opportunity and responsibility that
should rightly have been theirs.23
19. See Freidin & Ulman, Arbitration; and the National War Labor Board, 58 HARv. L. REv.
309 (1945).
20. See note 1 supra.
21. See Waddleton, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH
ANN. MEETING 92 (1960), wherein Professor Handsaker's speech on "Arbitration and Con-
tract Disputes" is discussed.
22. Pub. L. No. 88, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 28, 1963).
23. Opinion of the Neutral Members (Benjamin Aaroh, James J. Healy, Ralph T. Seward),
National Mediation Board, Arbitration Board No. 282 (Nov. 26, 1963).
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Compulsory arbitration represents a final rejection of a competitive
economy philosophy in which industrial disputes are resolved through
free collective bargaining.24 The late President Kennedy stated that
compulsory arbitration cannot be reconciled with a free enterprise
economy.2" Also, Secretary of Labor Wirtz has observed: "Collective
bargaining is industrial democracy. We have to make it work."26  And
yet, as in the railroad dispute, whenever a critical strike threatens, thought
immediately turns to forced settlement through compulsory arbitration.
The characteristic of this procedure is that the parties are required by
law to submit their dispute to a statutorily created arbitration board whose
award binds the disputants in future dealings. Moreover, the parties
are required to terminate all forms of self-help such as strikes or lock-
outs.
2 7
A form of compulsory arbitration legislation was established at the
federal level in wartime," and is found today in the grievance settlement
procedure under the Railway Labor Act."9  Although no state provides
for compulsory arbitration of labor disputes in private industry, a few
do provide for it in certain public utilities."0 Four of the fifteen states
that had regulated public utilities in this manner ultimately had their
statutes declared invalid."' The key decision in this area is Amalgamated
Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Bd.32 There, the Supreme Court invalidated the
24. See KELLER, ARBITRATION IN ACTION 7 (1941).
25. KHEEL, THE PROS AND CONS OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 13 (1961).
26. See note 11 supra.
27. Note, The Peaceful Settlement Of Disputes Over Contrart Terms, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 556,
576 (1963); Sturges, "Compulsory Arbitration" - What is it? 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4,
10 (1961).
28. War Labor Disputes Act (Smith-Connolly Act), 57 Stat. 163 (1943), 50 U.S.C. § 1501
(Supp. 1944). Prior to the enactment of this act, the President, by EXEC. ORDER No. 9017,
7 Fed. Reg. 257 (1942), had provided for the National War Labor Board to settle disputes
through "mediation, voluntary arbitration or arbitration under rules provided by the Board."
29. 45 U.S.C. 9 152(3) (i). Under the Railway Labor Act, the railroad and airline in-
dustries, both regulated by the federal government, are subject to rather complicated pro-
cedures before management or labor can call a lockout or strike over terms and conditions of
a new contract. The tendency might be for management to accept the terms offered by the
government because they are government regulated, while labor need not accept the terms.
30. Since World War II, thirteen states have established procedures for mediation and arbi-
tration of labor disputes in public utilities. Most of them either absolutely prohibit strikes and
lockouts, or permit them only after all procedures outlined in the law have been complied with.
Those states are: Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Miss-
ouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
31. Statutes in Florida, Indiana, Kansas, and Wisconsin have been declared invalid. See
Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951); Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Rela-
tions, 262 U.S. 522 (1923); State of Florida ex rel. Lee v. Henderson, 32 I.R.R.M. 2169
(1962), aff'd, 65 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1953). The New Jersey statute was declared unconstitu-
tional for failure to provide sufficient standards to an administrative agency. See State v.
Traffic Tel. Workers' Fed'n, 2 N.J. 235, 66 A.2d 616 (1949).
32. 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
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Wisconsin statute on the grounds that Congress, through the Taft-
Hartley Act, had preempted the field of regulating strikes in industries
"affecting commerce," and held that even public utilities whose activities
were confined to a single state came within the definition of industries
"affecting commerce." The Court reasoned that federal labor legislation
contemplates continued collective bargaining, even after a strike is started,
and thus no state requirement for compulsory arbitration could be upheld.
The dissent argued that there is no right to strike against the general
welfare.33
As a result of this decision, states having similar statutes have been
reluctant to enforce them.34 The decision in the Wisconsin case therefore
ended the post-war boom of state compulsory arbitration legislation that
had arisen to deal with strikes whose toll on total work time reached
1.6 per cent in 1946, a total not reached since.
Several proposals have been made that the National Labor Relations
Act be amended to return full authority in the public utilities labor
relations area to the states.35 Congress made a step in this direction in
the 1959 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.36 Section
701 of that act, which amended the Taft-Hartley Act, in effect returns
jurisdiction to the states over all matters rejected by the National Labor
Relations Board because of their relative unimportance to interstate com-
merce. The monetary limitations set by the Board for its jurisdiction
returns at least the smaller employers to state control.3 But, unless
the Court reverses its previous view, or unless Congress enacts enabling
legislation, it seems that states may only control strikes in publicly owned
utilities and hospitals.38 Also, public employees are prohibited from
striking by the federal government and by many states.39
33. Id. at 404-05.
34. See KHEEL, op. cit. supra note 25, at 31-33.
35. See Heiges, State Labor Legislation for Public Utilities Disputes, 61 PUB. UTIL. FORT.
587 (1958); Schultz, The Massachusetts Choice of Procedures Approach To Emergency Dis-
putes, 10 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 359 (1952).
36. 73 Stat. 519-46, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1959).
37. See UPDEG A F & McCoy, op. cit. supra note 18, at 134-59. The desire, says Updegraff,
for protection is apparently as great as before the Wisconsin decision. In 1956, Maryland
enacted a statute providing for state seizure of utilities whose operation is endangered by a
labor dispute. MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, §§ 14-24 (1956). See Note, Ohio Utility Anti-
Strike Law, 58 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 912 (1956).
38. See, e.g., Fairview Hosp. Ass'n v. Public Bldg. Serv., 241 Minn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16
(1959).
39. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 declared it to be unlawful for any
individual employed by the United States, or by any agency thereof, including wholly owned
government corporations, to participate in any strike. Penalties for violations of the act include
immediate discharge, forfeiture of any civil service status, and ineligibility for reemployment
for three years by the United States or any such agency. 29 U.S.C. § 188 (1947), as amended,
69 Star. 625 (1955) (now 5 U.S.C. § 118p-r (1955)). See State v. Brotherhood of Ry.
Trainmen, 37 Cal. 2d 412, 213 P.2d 857 (1951), cert denied, 342 U.S. 876 (1952), hold-
ing that a strike does not constitute a violation of equal protection. See also Cleveland v. Divi-
[Vol. 15:735
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Congress has the power to enact federal compulsory arbitration from
its power of control over interstate commerce. Thus, in Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R.,4" involving a 1963 award in the railroad dispute, the district court
held that the government may "regulate persons engaged in a public call-
ing or in a calling coupled with a public interest."'" The opinion noted
the expanded concept of commerce and compared the compulsory legis-
lation in the instant case to that in Wilson v. New." The Wilson case
challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute fixing an eight hour
day on all railroads and providing that compensation of employees should
not be reduced below the then standard day's wage, pending investigation
by a Presidential Commission. The Supreme Court held:
Congress had the power to adopt the act in question, whether it be
viewed as a direct fixing of wages to meet the absence of standard on
that subject resulting from the dispute between the parties or as to the
exertion by Congress of the power which it undoubtedly possessed to
provide by appropriate legislation for compulsory arbitration .. .3
The district court also found in the Locomotive Firemen case that
Congress did not lack authority to delegate its legislative power to make
the determinations required of the compulsory arbitration board.44 The
court of appeals affirmed the decision and certiorari was denied by the
Supreme Court.
Compulsory arbitration, while almost universally repudiated as the
antithesis of free collective bargaining, may be used more frequently in
dealing with national emergencies either on an ad hoc or permanent basis
if an alternative procedure, such as voluntary arbitration, is not found. 5
The following arguments have been leveled at compulsory arbitra-
tion:4" (1) It discourages the making of offers and counteroffers in
collective bargaining negotiations when the parties know that they are
merely fighting over the levels at which the arbitrators will start. (2)
The parties will tend to list a great many demands for negotiations,
dropping none, in an effort to influence the arbitrators on the important
issues by their losses on the minor ones. (3) Compulsion may outlaw
sion 268, Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. Employees, 84 Ohio App. 43, 81 N.E.2d
310 (1948).
40. 225 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1964), affd, 55 L.R.R.M. 2517 (Feb. 20, 1964), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 918 (1964).
41. 225 F. Supp. 11, 21 (D.D.C. 1964).
42. 243 U.S. 332 (1917).
43. Id. at 352.
44. 225 F. Supp. 11, 22-23 (D.D.C. 1964).
45. Fleming, The Search for a Formula, in EMERGENCY DIsPuTEs AND NATIONAL POLICY
207-17 (1955).
46. See Dash, The Academy and Public Opinion, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH ANN. MEETING 1, 9 (1960).
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strikes, but it cannot prevent them from occurring, especially when there
is great resentment over an award. (4) The parties are usually given
no opportunity to choose the outsiders who will settle their dispute or
give them the criteria that are an integral part of many voluntary
arbitration proceedings. (5) As Senator Taft once argued that "if we
impose compulsory arbitration ... I do not see how in the end we can
escape a collective economy."4 The more often the government legis-
lates in this manner, the more uniform the application of economic
criteria for all industries. This leads naturally to wage and price controls.
(6) It is impossible to divorce the imposition of compulsory arbitration
from politics. The political climate might easily jeopardize the interests
of one of the parties by playing a significant part in shaping the arbitra-
tor's award.
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION FOR WRITING NEw CONTRACT TERMS
Use of Voluntary Contract Arbitration
A survey conducted at the University of California shows that 91
per cent of management and 93 per cent of unions approve of voluntary
arbitration for settling grievances. However, only 31 per cent of man-
agement and 47 per cent of unions approve of its use in writing the
terms of contracts.4" The approval of contract arbitration registered in
the survey is not reflected in the number of contracts actually providing
for such arbitration. A soon to be published study of virtually all major
agreements in effect in the United States in 1961 reveals that an over-
whelming majority of the contracts contained no reference to arbitration
of contract terms. Some of the contracts specifically banned such arbitra-
tion. Those that stipulated binding arbitration of new terms or provided
for arbitration of economic issues under reopenings accounted for less
than 6 per cent of the contracts studied and of the workers covered by
them. A few of the agreements provided for arbitration of new terms
or issues arising under reopenings if both parties agreed.
Provisions for arbitration of disputes over new contract terms are
found mainly in public transportation (local and suburban transit),
utility, and construction contracts. Provisions for arbitration of disputes
over reopening of economic issues are concentrated in a small number
of industries with long-term contracts, such as apparel, restaurants and
hotels, services, transportation (maritime, local and suburban transit, and
longshoring), public utilities, and retail trade.
47. 93 CONG. REc. 3835-36 (1947).
48. Warren & Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration, 16 LAB. ARB. 970, 971-72 (1951).
49. Forthcoming publication of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The agreements studied
accounted for nearly all agreements covering 1,000 or more workers each, exclusive of rail-
road and airline agreements.
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The Bureau's analysis of work stoppages in 1961 and 1962 gives
additional information as to the use of arbitration in writing contract
terms. In 1961, there were 171 work stoppages in industries where the
contract was either the first between the parties, a renegotiation (expiration
or reopening), or where the issue was to be settled after work resumed.
In 1962, there were 161 such cases. In 1960, arbitration was to be used
in 50 of the 171 cases, while in 1962, it was to be used in 49 of the 161
cases.
50
Criticisms
The similarity between compulsory arbitration and voluntary arbitra-
tion is so obvious that it cannot be ignored by even the most partisan
advocate of the latter method. It follows, therefore, that the criticisms
will be much the same for both procedures. It should be noted first,
however, that the assumed ills encountered in both compulsory and
voluntary arbitration are more easily cured in the latter system since
the parties have more control over the role the-process will play, both
in method and in scope, in settling their dispute.
As noted previously, one of the objections to arbitration of contract
terms is that it is a deterrent to free collective bargaining. The contention
is that so long as the parties have reason to believe an issue will be
compromised by an outsider, the incentive for good faith bargaining is
lost. Moreover, in the course of normal collective bargaining the parties
are encouraged to produce new solutions to contract problems. Arbitra-
tion, on the other hand, might have a stifling effect upon the inventive-
ness of the parties in their private bargaining, thus shifting a responsibil-
ity which is properly borne by the parties themselves.51 It is also argued
that a strike is the price a country must pay for industrial democracy
and that only in a narrowly defined "national emergency" should
neutrals take part in the bargaining process.52
Further criticism is that arbitrating new contract terms is too risky, be-
cause the arbitrator is without the clear guides or standards of a collective
bargaining agreement to guide him in legislating his award. There is a
basic difference, the critics say, between declaring the rights of grievance
claimants by interpreting existing agreements, and permitting an arbitra-
tor to rely entirely on his own sense of discretion and economic under-
50. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1339, ANALYSIS OF
WORK STOPPAGES 1961, 7 (1962).
51. Handsaker, Arbitration and Contract Disputes, in NATIONAL AcADEMY OF ARBITRA-
TORS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH ANN. MEETING 78-79 (1960); Note, Quasi-Legislative
Arbitration Agreements, 64 COLuM. L. REv. 109, 113 (1964).
52. Seidman, National Emergency Strike Legislation, in SYMPOSIUM ON LABOR RELATIONS
LAW 473, 474 (1961); See also United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S.
39, 62 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
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standing of the interests involved in writing contract terms. Thus, along
with the risk of unpredictability goes the risk of a bad decision of major
significance.53 For example, an extreme award with regard to wages
may bankrupt a company or, on the other hand, "sentence the workers to
a seriously substandard wage for the life of the agreement." 4
To those who point to arbitration's success in England and other coun-
tries, the argument is made that while England's official record of de-
terring strikes may be good, there are so many "unofficial" strikes due to
dissatisfaction with contract terms that the advantages of arbitration are
negated. Furthermore, in England the acceptance of an award from the
Industrial Court is voluntary, as is the submission of the issue by the
parties." In this country, such a system would be said to be nothing
more than fact finding with recommendations. Here, the arbitration proc-
ess demands that for the most part the awards be enforceable.56 An
additional point raised by detractors might be that the public interest,
whatever that may be, should be reflected in an award setting contract
terms. Hence a public body, it is said, such as is created by compulsory
arbitration legislation, is in a better position to interpret that interest.
Perhaps the greatest drawback to increased use of voluntary arbitra-
tion is found in the "deeply ingrained" attitude of labor and management
against it,57 rather than in their logical objections to it. Both sides feel
that their interests will somehow be prejudiced by an arbitrator who lacks
a complete understanding of the issues,58 and that it is not likely that they
will have an arbitrator who understands those issues.
Advantages
One of the principal advantages of the voluntary arbitration process
is the ability of the parties to control it. If wisely employed, voluntary
arbitration can meet many of the disadvantages considered in the preced-
ing paragraphs.
Professor Handsaker forcefully argues that "interest" arbitration
should be used only as a last resort measure just before a work stoppage
53. Handsaker, Arbitration and Contract Disputes, op. cit. supra note 51, at 85.
54. Handsaker, Changing Role of Arbitration and Changing Issues, N.Y.U. 14TH ANN.
CONF. ON LABOR 183 (1961).
55. Address by L.G. Johnston, "The Arbitration of New Contract Provisions," Conference on
Critical Issues in Arbitration, Western Reserve University, April 6, 1963.
56. See note 79 infra and accompanying text.
57. KHEEL, op. cit. supra note 25, at 13-15.
58. In Speilman, Labor Disputes on Rights and on Interests, 29 AMER. EcON. REv. 302
(1939), the author states that he would not advocate arbitration for disputes over principles;
nor would he arbitrate when the general principles upon which the settlement is to be based
are agreed upon. In such cases, he states, an arbitrator can do little more than give expression
to his subjective preference in the matter. This is the traditional argument against arbitration.
It appears, therefore, that Speilman thinks a contest of strength is the only solution.
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might occur, thereby minimizing any deteriorating effect upon the pre-
ceding collective bargaining negotiations. 9  The parties, he further ar-
gues, would not be anticipating the arbitration and would therefore be
more likely to bargain in good faith than if voluntary arbitration were
contractually provided for long in advance of any breakdown in negotia-
tions. An argument inconsistent with the foregoing is that inclusion of
an arbitration clause to determine contract terms, if the parties fail to
agree, will have a positive effect on their negotiations because of the in-
herent distaste of the parties for such arbitration."0 Of course, if that
distaste is so great it is unlikely that such a clause would have been
initially agreed upon.
The argument that contract arbitration is too risky may be met on a
policy ground that the possible economic loss to both parties, as well as
to the community, from a work stoppage is a risk to be weighed against
peaceful settlement by an arbitrator who is also operating in an inherently
risky process."' On balance, the wiser choice is the arbitrator, especially
if the risks to that process are further minimized by the parties. Addi-
tionally, the cost of arbitration is negligible as compared to the potential
cost of a work stoppage. Professor Handsaker suggests the limited sub-
mission agreement, and the choice of a tri-partite board which includes
an experienced neutral arbitrator, as an effective method of reducing these
risks. 6
2
Granting that the arbitrator in "interests" disputes must be given more
leeway than in the normal grievance arbitration, the parties may, never-
theless, limit his jurisdiction. The parties may also limit the number of
issues submitted, or indicate the general principles which the arbitrator
must follow (similar to grievance arbitration). Furthermore, they may
require the arbitrator, in light of the evidence presented, to apply those
principles. This is not as simple as it sounds, for the argument may be
valid that if the parties could have agreed on all aspects of a submission
agreement, they probably would have agreed on the contract terms in
question. But even in those cases where a limited submission agreement
is not made, the arbitrator has a wealth of guidelines and standards to
aid him.
The tri-partite arbitration board might have the effect of ensuring a
decision dose to that which would have been collectively bargained for,
because the views of the partisan members of such a panel would influ-
ence the neutral's position. This is especially true when the neutral is
59. See Handsaker, Arbitration and Contract Disputes, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBI-
TRlATORS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH ANN. MEETiNG 18-19 (1960); Handsaker, Changing
Role of Arbitration and Changing Issues, N.Y.U. 14TH ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 183 (1961).
60. TRiPP, WAGE-REOPENING ARBrnRATiON 82-83 (1952).
61. Handsaker, op. cit. supra note 51, at 84.
62. Id. at 85.
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not authorized to make an award in the absence of a majority and is then
required to compromise an extreme position in order to gain the support
of one or more of the partisans.63
An additional safeguard lies in choosing an arbitrator in whom the
parties have confidence. Probably the best choice is an arbitrator with
considerable arbitration experience and knowledge of the particular in-
dustry calling upon him.
Since it is alleged that one of the "risks" in voluntary contract arbitra-
tion is lack of standards, it should be emphasized that even without a
restrictive submission agreement, the arbitrator has available to him all
the accepted standards" which the parties themselves might have used.
This substantially reduces the risk of a decision having an illogical basis.
However, this is not to say that the burden on an arbitrator is not substan-
tial in contract cases, or that arbitrators are geniuses who naturally apply
the standards wisely.65 But standards are available, and as one arbitrator
has said: "The function we set for ourselves at the outset [is] ... to de-
termine what the parties, as reasonable men, should themselves have
agreed to at the bargaining table.""
One of the most important standards employed is "prevailing prac-
tice."" In a wage determination, for example, this entails consideration
of wages paid in comparable jobs in other plants in the area, and a con-
sideration of wages of comparable jobs in other plans within the same
industry. However, there may be reasons why a particular employer
should be required to pay more or less than prevailing rates. Some of
these reasons include differences in skill and training of the individual,
differences in responsibility, steadiness of employment, hazards and other
undesirable conditions of work, geographical differentials, fringe benefits,
wage leadership, and historical differentials. If no prevailing practice
exists, there is an extra burden of proof on the party seeking to improve
contract terms.
An arbitrator might also consider as standards the cost of living and
the ability of the employer to pay." The latter should be carefully con-
strued in light of the performance of the company over a period of years.
It is interesting to note that it is not an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to refuse to allow the union to see his books unless it pleads in-
63. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, op cit. supra note 12, at 60.
64. For a general discussion of this area see ELKOURI & ELKOURI, op. cit. supra note 12, at
442 and cases cited therein.
65. See RAo, MEDIATION CONcnzIATIoN AND ARBITRATION U.S.A. AND INDIA 195
(1963); Address by Northrup, National Association of Manufacturers, 68th Congress of
American Industry (1963), in 54 LR.R.M. 83,85 (1964).
66. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 845, 858 (1947).
67. See generally McLaughlin, Custom and Past Praaice in Labor Arbitration, 18 ARB. J.
205 (1963).
68. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, op. cit. supra note 12, at 455.
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ability to pay." Sometimes the special competitive nature of an em-
ployer's business may also be taken into consideration. Wage patterns,"
that is, the wages paid in related industries, might also be considered.
Basing an arbitral award on the productivity of the particular company
with regard to wages has also been the basis of some decisions.7
Although maintenance of take-home pay is a much attacked stand-
ard, 2 it has been used in a situation where shorter hours are requested
in order to keep everybody working, and the union demands pay equal to
that formerly received by its men. The past practices" of the parties as
well as their positions prior to submitting the case for arbitration will
help the arbitrator understand the basic issues and the conflicting posi-
tions.
Another advantage of "interest" arbitration is that it permits the
public interest to be carried out in the peaceful settlement of major in-
dustrial disputes without government intervention. Other public interests
that an arbitrator might consider and which the arbitration process might
serve are: (1) concern with inflationary forces, (2) ability of American
industry to meet competition in world markets, and (3) the image of
the United States in the world, especially that of efficient maintenance
of operations.74 Traditionally, it is the government that intervenes in
behalf of the public interest when the situation warrants. However, there
is no guarantee that the nebulous term "public interest" is best interpreted
by the government. Private citizens, that is, arbitrators working with the
parties involved in a dispute, are also capable of interpreting the public
interest and ensuring that it is reflected in their agreement.75 As Justice
Goldberg, then Secretary of Labor stated: "No one has the monopoly
to define the public interest; everyone has the obligation to serve it."
Leaders in industrial relations both in and outside the government
have, in varying degrees, lent their support to voluntary contract arbitra-
tion as an indication of responsible collective bargaining not outside the
scope of that concept and in the public interest.
In a May 1962 report, the President's Advisory Committee on Labor-
Management Policy asserted:
We reject the idea that there should be any legal requirement that dis-
putes be resolved through compulsory arbitration. If the parties choose
to submit their differences to arbitration, in which the award is final and
69. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 856 (1954), aff'd, 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
70. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, op. ci. supra note 12, at 471.
71. Id. at 472.
72. Id. at 476.
73. Id. at 479.
74. Cole, U.S. Intervention Kills Collective Bargaining, Nation's Business, March 1962, p. 38.
75. Brown, The Public Interest: Who Can Judge It?, Nation's Business, June 1962, p. 70.
76. Address, 50th Anniversary of U.S. Dep't of Labor, March 4, 1963.
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binding, that is of course proper and compatible with the concept of free
collective bargaining.77
Secretary of Labor Wirtz was even more emphatic when he compli-
mented Pan American World Airways and the Flight Engineers, and the
United Plant Guard Workers Unions on an agreement containing an
arbitration clause for all future disputes. He stated:
These agreements are the product of the determination of this company
and these unions to find a better way than economic warfare to settle
their differences. In an industry so vital to the public welfare, this rep-
resents a significant contribution to the national interest.78
It appears therefore that voluntary contract arbitration offers the parties
a controllable method of solving their disputes without government in-
tervention in the name of the public interest. Use of this method seems
to be assertion enough of the public interest which, though having a
great number of elements when being defined, is principally concerned
with maintenance of production. Certainly in the large industries the
choice for the disputants who have reached a work stoppage stage in
negotiations may now only be between ultimate compulsory arbitration
or voluntary arbitration, for it seems clear that the government will not,
in the name of public interest, permit production to stop.
Enforcement of Agreements and Awards
As noted previously in this discussion, the reason given by many
parties for not entering into an agreement to arbitrate a future dispute
over the terms for new contracts was that such a clause in a collective bar-
gaining agreement might become a built-in deterrent to normal collec-
tive bargaining.7 An additional reason is that if there is a great time
lapse between entering into such an agreement and an actual controversy,
one of the parties might well seek to withdraw from the agreement. The
courts have traditionally been less than friendly toward the idea of en-
forcing "quasi-judicial" agreements to arbitrate.
Executory agreements to arbitrate were not enforced at common law
and the party who sought to enforce the agreement was usually left to
nominal damages."s The courts refused to enforce contracts to arbitrate
future disputes on the grounds that it was against public policy to have
important legal rights and interests determined without judicial safe-
77. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, Report by the President's Advisory Committee on Labor-
Management Relations 1 (1962).
78. U.S. Dep't of Labor Release No. 5774 (June 7, 1963).
79. Handsaker, Arbitration and Contract Disputes, in NATIONAL AcADEMY OF ARBITRA-
TORS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH ANN. MEETING 78-79 (1960); Handsaker, Changing Role
of Arbitration and Changing Issues, N.Y.U. 14TH ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 183 (1961).
80. FREIDIN, LABOR ARBITRATION AND THE CoURTs 2 (1952); see, e.g., Local 1111,
United Elec. Workers v. Allen-Bradley Co., 259 Wis. 609, 49 N.W.2d 720 (1951).
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guards. Furthermore, it was apparent that the courts did not want to
lose business to non-judicial third party neutrals.8' However, the com-
mon law rule has given way to state statutes authorizing enforcement of
these agreements, but some statutes, nevertheless, either specifically ex-
clude labor arbitration, or are limited only to justiciable controversies,
thus excluding agreements to arbitrate future "interests" disputes.8"
The federal courts are in disagreement over the applicability of the
United States Arbitration Act8" - an act designed to encourage arbitra-
tion - to labor arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.84
The reason for this is that the act does not apply to "contracts of employ-
ment" of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers en-
gaged in interstate or foreign commerce. In addition to the disagreement
over whether "contracts of employment" include collective bargaining
agreements, the question also arises as to whether workers whose work
affects commerce are covered, or whether a covered worker must actually
be engaged in commerce.
In Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v. Potter Press,85 the court re-
fused to enforce an agreement which had a reopening provision calling
for arbitration if conciliation failed, and further provided that the agree-
ment would remain in force "until all differences are settled by concilia-
tion or arbitration."8  The court found no support to enforce what it
characterized as quasi-legislative arbitration. It assumed for purposes of
the opinion that Congress could have given the courts jurisdiction to en-
force such agreements, but that neither the United States Arbitration Act
nor section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act8" conferred that authority. Both
acts, the opinion stated, evidenced a concern with quasi-judicial, not quasi-
legislative disputes. Interestingly, the opinion left open the question of
whether Congress actually had the authority to pass legislation controlling
an interest dispute, since article III of the Constitution limits the power
of the federal courts to cases or controversies."8 The opinion cited state
court cases produced under restrictive legislation in which those courts
81. Note, Quasi-Legislative Arbitration Agreements, 64 COLUM. L REv. 109, 120 (1964).
82. See Gregory & Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17 U. CHI.
L REV. 233, 238-45 (1950). States limiting enforcement of future disputes to justiciable
controversies are Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Tennessee.
83. 43 Star. 883 (1925), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1958).
84. See Burstein, The United States Arbitration Act - A Reevaluation, 3 VILL. L. REV.
125 (1958).
85. 141 F. Supp. 553 (D. Mass. 1956), affd, 241 F.2d 787 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 817 (1957).
86. Id. at 554.
87. 61 Star. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
88. 141 F. Supp. 553, 557 (1956).
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did not find disputes over future terms to be the "subject of an action.""
One possible ground for attacking the Potter Press decision is that there
seems to be an assumption that there was no contract even though the ar-
bitration clause provided for the terms of the agreement to continue until
an arbitration was held. The argument has been expressed that a reopen-
ing clause is part of an existing contract90 and it therefore might be en-
forceable under section 301.
The Supreme Court, however, greatly expanded the enforceability of
grievance arbitration under federal law in Textile Workers Union v. Lin-
coln Mills9 and subsequent cases.92 But, it has never ruled on the enforce-
ment of agreements to arbitrate interest disputes. If the duty to arbitrate
is construed in the "context of the national labor policy favoring arbitra-
tion for tests of strength between contending forces,"93 perhaps the Court
will finally construe the obligation to arbitrate interest disputes as a
continuing contractual duty and enforce such agreements.94 There seems
no logical basis, in view of the broad language (including a "presumption
of arbitrability") that the Court has used, to exclude enforcement of
agreements to engage in contract arbitration.
Enforcement of an award in which the arbitrator has written new
contract terms would not appear to cause difficulty since the award should
be considered a new contract and a party may sue for its enforcement con-
sistent with the above quoted national labor policy.95
CONCLUSION
When the late President Kennedy asked for emergency legislation in
the summer of 1963, to prevent a nationwide railroad strike, he stated
that such a strike would force almost immediate shutdown of all
industrial establishments which depend primarily on rail shipments;
would jeopardize the fruit, vegetable, and grain crops; would disrupt mail
89. E.g., In re Buffalo & Erie Ry., 250 N.Y. 275, 165 N.E. 291 (1929). The New York
statute now authorizes arbitration of labor controversies "without regard to the justiciable
nature of the controversy." In the Matter of Hotel Concord, 140 N.Y.S.2d, 848, 849 (Sup.
Ct. 1955).
90. In re Buffalo & Erie Ry., 250 N.Y. 275, 277, 165 N.E. 291, 292 (1929) (dissenting
opinion). See also Note, The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Over Contract Terms, 58 Nw.
U.L. REV. 556, 563 (1963).
91. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
92. E.g., Local 721, Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247 (1964);
John Wiley & Sons Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); United Steelworkers v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay.
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
93. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., supra note 92, at 596.
94. There must, of course, be a contractual obligation. See John Wiley & Sons Inc. v. Liv-
ingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), where contract rights had "vested" before the contract expired.
95. See Note, The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Over Contract Terms, 58 Nw. U.L. REV.
556, 568 (1963).
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